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IF YOU CAN'T TRUST THE FARMER, WHO CAN YOU TRUST?
THE EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION TYPES ON
PURCHASES OF ORGANIC PRODUCE
Lynn Hunnicutt, John E. Keith, and Ruby Ward

ABSTRACT

An information asymmetry exists in the market for organic produce since consumers

cannot determine whether produce is organically or conventionally grown. Various methods
may solve this problem including signaling, reputation, and certification. Signaling and
reputation may not work well, because signals are noisy, and reputation may be difficult for a
producer to establish. Certification of the farm and its growing methods shows the most
promise. A survey instrument testing the efficacy of certification is presented along with
empirical analysis suggesting that no notable difference existed between independent
certification methods, although independent certification had significantly different effects than
self-certification.
Key words: asymmetric information, certification, ordered probit, organic produce

IF YOU CAN'T TRUST THE FARMER, WHO CAN YOU TRUST?
THE EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION TYPES ON
PURCHASES OF ORGANIC PRODUCE*

Introduction

How do consumers know whether the produce they buy is organic? Many stores have an
organic produce section, and various claims regarding growing methods are made. Generally
speaking, organic produce commands a premium price (Lohr), although absent labels,
distinguishing between organically and conventionally grown fruit and vegetables is quite
difficult. This may cause consumers to be suspicious about any claims regarding growing
methods. The information asymmetry that causes this problem has aspects of both moral hazard
(hidden actions) and adverse selection (hidden characteristics).
In this paper, we discuss the theory of asymmetric information and its application to the

market for organic produce. The literature suggests certification resolves asymmetry, although
only if certification is credible and believed. The USDA has recently established standards and
instituted an inspection and certification program for organic produce (see the National Organic
Program homepage, \vww.ams.usda.gov/nop). Additionally, individual producers, stores, some
states and many third party organizations certify produce as "organic." To test the ability of
these programs to resolve problems caused by information asymmetry, we analyze data from a
recently administered survey asking questions about consumer response to various certifying

*Senior authorship is shared equally among all authors. Authors are respectively Assistant Professor,
Professor, and Assistant Professor all of Utah State University. The authors wish to acknowledge support for this
project from the Economics Department at Utah State University and from the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station,
Utah State University, Logan, Utah. The authors gratefully acknowledge (without implicating) Paul Jakus and
David Dickinson for helpful comments on this research.
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organizations. This leads to preliminary conclusions regarding the efficacy of various types of
certification, and their probable effect on purchases of organic produce.
Information Asymmetry and Organic Produce

A principal-agent model such as that presented in Akerlof may be used to describe the
market for organic produce. 1 Organic produce is perceived by some consumers as higher quality
than conventionally grown produce, but organic growing methods are more costly than
conventional methods. Buyers have no way to verify whether the fruit and vegetables they
purchase are organically or conventionally grown. Because of this, growers are tempted to label
all produce organic, whether or not it was organically produced. This is the problem of adverse
selection (hidden characteristics). Even when buyers are willing to pay a large premium for
organically grown produce, it is not likely to appear on the market. As long as consumers cannot
verify the claims made for the produce, growers will be tempted to claim to have produced
organically while actually using conventional methods, as this reduces their costs and increases
their profits. This is the problem of moral hazard (hidden action). Asymmetric information
means that organically grown produce is less available for consumers who are willing to pay for

There are several ways to resolve these problems. The first suggests that if consumers
can observe some signal of product quality (e.g., number of blemishes, size of the fruit,
variations in color), then they can assess the likelihood that organic methods were used. In

lIn addition to the theoretical literature, Akerlof's idea appears in several areas including information
labeling on food (Caswell and Mojduszka), product safety (Kerton and Bodell), job markets (Ryoo) and yard sales
(Cabral and Sakovics).

2It is assumed that information asymmetry between the farmer and the wholesaler carries through to the
[mal customer. Thus, while we discuss the consumer's beliefs regarding the farmer 's production methods, we mean
to imply the consumer's beliefs regarding the entire system from which she purchases.
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theory, consumers could then set up a pricing scheme that involves higher payment for
increasing likelihood of organic production methods. Under this pricing scheme, farmers are
either rewarded for using organic growing methods or punished for using conventional methods.
Grossman and Hart present the generally accepted methodology for using signals to set up such a
pricing scheme, and demonstrate that noisier signals and smaller willingness-to-pay differentials
make it harder to reduce moral hazard. Cosmetic appearance seems to be a noisy signal
according to Thompson and Kidwell, who found that organic produce did not always have more
cosmetic defects.
Problems caused by information asymmetry can also be overcome through the
establishment of a reputation. Repeated interaction between the producer and the consumer
allows for development of a reputation (Heal), because consumers are able to withhold future
purchases from farmers caught using conventional methods. Even without repeat purchases, as
long as new consumers are able to discover the farmer's reputation, information asymmetry may
be eliminated. However, reputation works only if consumers can discover that conventional
growing methods are being used, and only if consumers can punish the offending producer.
Neither of these conditions is likely to be met, as organic produce is a credence good
(McCluskey), and the food system is so complex that tracing products to an individual grower is
nearly impossible.
Finally, problems of information asymmetry can be avoided if growers are able to make
verifiable claims regarding production methods, through certification or licensing. A publicly
available standard for what constitutes organic produce could make growers willing to use
organic (more expensive) methods, as long as it leads to higher prices or sales. According to
Lohr, certification removes asymmetric information by providing consumers assurances
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regarding the production methods used and ensuring producers that conventional growers will
not be able to make claims to produce organically. As noted above, the USDA recently
established national standards for organically grown products along with a system of inspections
to support truth in labeling regulations. Other programs have also been created to certify organic
produce, and while some are more stringent than the USDA standards, few are as well known or
as widely applied. 3
In order for certification to reduce information asymmetry, however, consumers must

believe the certifying organization. Consumer disbelief reduces willingness to pay, which makes
covering the higher cost of organic methods difficult, and reduces the likelihood that producers
will actually use them. The more trust the consumer places in the certifying organization, the
more likely it is that she will be willing to pay a higher price for certified organically grown
produce, and the more effective the certification program will be in enlarging the market for
organic produce.
Thompson reviews the literature on consumer demand for organic foods, and suggests
that demand is positively related to household size, and has a mixed relationship to age (young
and older middle-aged adults tend to buy the most organic produce). Education has an
interesting effect in that it is positively related to demand unless post-graduate education is
pursued in which case the opposite holds. While Thompson suggests that income may not be
related to organic purchases, he notes that national studies generally suggest a positive
relationship between income and organic consumption. In the studies he reviews, gender and
marital status appear to have no significant effect on the propensity to purchase organic food. As

3Klonsky gives a good overview of what has happened in regards to certification, including the problems
the USDA has faced in forming a standard for certification.
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for the propensity to purchase certified organic produce, we posit that price increases due to
certification (shifting the supply curve) and consumer confidence in the certifying agency
(shifting the demand curve) should also influence purchasing behavior.
While much theoretical literature exists on certification as a way to overcome
information asymmetry, and several studies have examined the characteristics of organic

produce, this paper considers the effects of certification of organic produce. 4 Our goal is to
examine the efficacy of certification as a way to increase credibility of claims about production
methods and thereby increase the size of the market for organic produce.

The Study
To determine the efficacy of a certification program, a survey was designed using the
telephone-based Questionnaire Programming Language survey language (United States General
Accounting Office).5 The survey was administered to a random digit dial sample of Utah
residents via telephone from the end of May to early June 2001. Three thousand phone numbers
were used, from which nine hundred thirty-three usable responses were obtained, for a raw
response rate of 31.1 %. The remaining numbers were disconnected telephone numbers and
people that could not be reached (1,145), people who refused to participate (798), lost responses
from a corrupted disk (fewer than 20), or unusable responses because respondents did not
complete the survey, leading to an adjusted response rate of 50.3%.
Upon contact, the person most responsible for purchasing groceries was identified and

4We focus on produce as it is something that most households purchase, organically produced versions are
widely available, and conventionally grown and organically grown produce are generally sold in the same section of
the store, and have similar packaging.
5

A copy of the survey is available from the authors upon request.
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interviewed. Depending on how they answered preliminary questions, they were asked a set of
questions regarding how five types of certification would change their purchases of organic
produce. Figure 1 illustrates the order of questioning, and gives the number of respondents to
each set of questions.
Respondents were first asked whether or not they purchased organic produce. If they did,
several questions regarding the amount and reasons for purchasing organic produce were asked.
If the respondent did not purchase organic produce, they were asked if they thought that
certification was important for organic produce, and if they would or would not purchase organic
produce if it were certified.
Respondents who indicated that certification was important to them were then asked to
indicate how certification by five different agents-the farmer, the retailer, an independent
organization (such as Good Housekeeping), the Utah state government, or the federal
government-would affect the quantity of organic produce they purchase. We used a 5-point
categorical (Likert-type) response scale, including "greatly increase," "increase," "not change,"
"decrease" and "greatly decrease." Note that the responses "decrease" and "greatly decrease"
would be unexpected for any certifying agency.
These respondents were then asked how certification would affect their purchase of
organic produce ifit added 10% to the current price, using the same response scale. For all
respondents for whom certification was not important, but who might purchase organic produce,
the question regarding the 10% price increase for certified organic produce was posed. All
respondents were asked questions regarding socioeconomic characteristics of the household.
Respondents who purchased organic produce or who indicated "appearance" or "other" as
reasons for not purchasing organic produce were asked if appearance or labeling with respect to
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growth, care and shipping affected their purchase of organic produce.

The Model
We used the data to examine two issues-the effect of certification on purchases of
organically grown produce, and the effect of a price increase (caused by certification) on
purchases of certified produce. In the first model, we examine both the size and significance of
the relationship between various demographic variables and the qualitative change in quantity of
organic produce purchased due to type of certification. In short, we are trying to determine if
certification shifts the demand curve. Recall that questions were asked about five types of
certifying agency. Thus, five observations of the dependent variable were obtained from each
respondent. The panel nature of our data will need to be controlled for in regression analysis
described below. A list of variable names and descriptions is given in Table 1.
(Insert Table 1 here)
Following the discussion in Thompson, which examined purchasing behavior for organic
(certified or not) food, the following model was hypothesized:
(1) Purchasejj

=

Po+ PI

Genderj + Ps

* Buy Organic

* Age

Certification + PIO

j

+P6

j

+ P2

* Household Income

j

+ P3

* Household Size

j

+ P4

* Age/+ P7 * Educatio~ + Ps * Educatio~2 + P9 * Farm

* Store Certification

+Pll

* Independent Certification + P12 * State

Government Certification + Ejj
where i indexes households (respondents) and} indexes certification type. Certification was
expected to increase organic produce consumption for respondents with higher income levels,
larger household sizes, and who currently buy organic produce, suggesting that PI' P2 and P3
should be positive. While certification and socioeconomic variables may influence whether a

*
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respondent purchases organic produce, the variable "Buy Organic" is assumed exogenous, as it
describes current behavior with or without certification, while our endogenous variable
(Purchase) describes future behavior in response to certification. We expected that women would
be more likely to purchase organic produce, so that

P4 should also be positive (Thompson

concluded insignificance). According to Thompson, the relationship between age, education and
purchases of organic produce is non-linear, so that the expected signs of

P5 through P8 are

unclear.
Dummy variables for each of the certification programs were included in the above
model with federal certification used as the base case. If federal certification is most credible,
through

P12 should be negative.

P9

If (as is hypothesized) self-certification, whether by the farmer

or a retailer, is least credible, larger (absolute value) impacts should be observed for the farm and
store certification methods.
To address our second objective, examining the effects of a price increase due to
certification on organic purchases, we asked how respondents would react to five different types
of certification if the retail price increased by 10%. As before, the data set contains five
observations for each respondent, and regression analysis will have to control for the panel
nature of the data set. From these questions, a new model was formulated where the independent
variables include those indicating whether the respondent was currently buying organic produce,
household income, household size, gender, age and education level of respondent, dummy
variables for the type of certification, and dummy variables for the change in purchase of
certified organic produce without a price increase. Comparing this model to the one above will
allow us to examine the effects of a price increase on purchases of organic produce. See table 1
for a description of the variables.
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(2) Purchase2ij

=

Bo + BI * Buy Organic j + B2

Genderj + P5

* Age

Certification + PIO

j

+ P6

* Age

2 + P7

j

* Education

j

+ Ps * Educationj 2+ P9

j

+ P4

*

* Farm

* Store Certification + PII * Independent Certification + P12 * State

Government Certification+ P13
+ PI5

j

* Household Income + B3 * Household Size

* Decrease Org. Pur.

jj

*

+ PI6

Increase Org. Pur. jj + PI4

* No Change Org. Purchase

* Greatly Decrease Org. Pur.

jj

+

jj

£jj

Dummy variables for purchase response to certification without a price increase were
included as a proxy for belief in certification, with "greatly increase" purchases serving as the
base. The effect of the price increase was expected to be smallest in absolute terms for those
who indicated certification would greatly increase their purchases. This is because it is thought
that they value certification the most and will be less sensitive to a change in price. SO P13
through PI6 are predicted to be negative, indicating that less responsive consumers were more
sensitive to a 10% price increase. It is further expected that in absolute terms the coefficients
should be ordered from P13 (smallest) through PI6 (largest), suggesting a greater sensitivity to
price increases for people who respond negatively to certification.
One might expect that the coefficients on demographic variables should behave similarly
whether or not the price of organic produce increases, but the dummy variables for response to
certification without a price increase capture the effects of certification on organic purchases.
Thus, the signs of PI through Ps are more difficult to predict in this model. People who already
purchase organic produce and those with higher incomes are likely to be less sensitive to a price
increase, so P I and P2 should be positive. The signs of P3' through Ps are not predicted here, as
they give the effect of the respective variable on responsiveness to a price increase, rather than
the effect of this variable on responsiveness to certification. As before, self-certification (farm
and store) is not expected to be as believable as independent certification (independent, state,
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and federal government). This implies that P9 and PlO should be negative. The coefficients on
other certification methods should also be negative but smaller in absolute value.

Results
The sample was fairly representative of the Utah population as a whole. Average
household size in the sample was 3.11 persons (Table 1), while the 2000 Census average for
Utah is 3.13 persons (U.S. Census Bureau). Just under half (42%) of respondents had children
under 18 living in the household, which is slightly below the census average of 45.8%. Seventy
percent of respondents were female, and almost half (47%) of respondents were aware that
certification programs for organic produce existed. Only 31 % of the sample purchased organic
produce, mainly for health and quality reasons, and most of these spent less than one-fourth of
their produce budget on organic. Just over one-third of those purchasing organic produce looked
for certification in making their purchases. Three-quarters of respondents were aware that
organic produce must have certain characteristics, and over three-quarters (89%) of respondents
thought that uniform standards for organic produce were important.

Distribution ofResponses to Certification Types
Table 2 shows the effect of various certification methods on consumer purchases of
organic produce. 6 Note that the preponderance of responses for farm and store certification were
"no change" or "increase," while those for the independent, state and federal certification
programs were distributed more strongly toward the "increase" response. The bottom of Table 2

6These questions were posed to the 450 respondents who indicated that certification was important. In pretesting the survey, consumers who indicated certification was unimportant to them were also unable to respond to
how certification would affect their purchases. Given that certification is unimportant, it is assumed that various
types of certification would have no effect on purchases of organic produce.

11
reports the same information for the case where certification would raise the price by 10 percent.
As was expected, the distribution of responses shifted markedly toward less consumption when
certification raises the price of organic produce.
(Insert Table 2 Here)
Even when certification does not increase the price, the mean is slightly above "no
change," but has a large standard deviation. This tells us that most consumers will not adjust
their purchases of organic produce simply because a certification program is implemented.
However, as noted below in our regression results, certification will increase the purchases of
some consumers who are already purchasing organic produce. As the organic portion of the
produce market is small (Greene, 2000), the effects of certification on this segment of the market
may be substantial, even as most consumers continue to purchase conventional produce.

Estimation Results
The categorical responses regarding the effects of certification by various organizations
on levels of consumption (greatly increase to greatly decrease) were analyzed using ordered
probit estimations.? Results from the estimations are found in Tables 3 and 5. Since each
respondent gave answers for each of the five certification categories, the analysis had to account
for the panel nature of the data. This was accomplished using a generalized estimating equation
method which corrects for the potential non-independence of observations. The estimations
"grouped" the data so that demographic variables were held constant for each respondent, but
response to each certification type was allowed to vary. Note that in an ordered probit model the
7 Our regression specification is similar to a fixed-effects model. While this is not ideal, a random-effects
ordered probit model (attempted using both LIMDEP (Greene, 2001) and SAS) failed to generate useable results,
despite manipulations of both the models and the data. It is likely that the qualitative nature of almost all the
independent variables led to a failure of the random-effects algorithms to converge.
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effects of a given independent variable can only be interpreted relative to smallest (greatly
decrease) and largest (greatly increase) categories, so that conclusions about intermediate
responses cannot be made. In contrast to Loureiro et aI, number of children under 18 was also
not included in our regressions, as it is highly correlated with household size (correlation
coefficient of 0.842).
Consider first the responses to certification without a price increase, reported in Table 3.
Larger values for household size reduce the likelihood of the respondent greatly increasing
organic purchases. Larger household size may reduce responsiveness because many households
in Utah are quite large (Utah has the largest average household size of the 50 states according to
the US Bureau of the Census), so that purchasing more expensive organic produce may not be
(

economically feasible for most families.
(Insert Table 3 Here)
Our data verify Thompson's result that education has a non-linear relationship with
responsiveness to certification, with median education groups more responsive than both the
highly educated and those with very little schooling. Surprisingly, higher income reduces the
likelihood of greatly increasing organic purchases. 8 Finally, the results show that selfcertification (farm and store) compared to independent certification (federal, Utah, and third
party) significantly reduced the likelihood of a large response to certification.
Just over half (50.5%) of the responses were correctly predicted. Marginal effects for
significant variables are reported in Table 4. Because all regressors are discrete, and many are
categorical, reported effects give the change in the probability of response falling in each

8When regressions are run with dummy variables for income levels, only level 1 (under $15,000) remains
significant, while the signs and significance of all other variables remains as reported in Table 3.

.
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category when the variable listed changes from its smallest value to its largest value. Education
appears to have the largest absolute effect on the purchase responsiveness to certification,
followed more distantly by income, household size and the certifying agencies (farm or store).
(Insert Table 4 Here)
Next, the response to certification was analyzed for the case in which certification would
raise the price by 10%. Results are reported in Table 5. The sign on gender is negative,
suggesting that while women may be more responsive to certification (as shown by the positive
but insignificant sign on gender in the previous regression), they are also more sensitive to price
Increases.
(Insert Table 5 Here)
The coefficient on household size remains significant. As before, this suggests that a
price increase places a greater burden on larger households, causing purchases of organic
produce to decrease for larger household size. The coefficients on education and education
squared also remain highly significant, with the same signs as in the first regression. It appears
that those with median education levels are least responsive to a price increase. Of the
certification types, both farm and store certifications are significant that implies that these (nonindependent) certification types are least credible, and that the price increase has a similar effect
on responses to all other types of certification.
The dummy variables on responses to certification without a price increase are all very
significant and behave as was hypothesized. All groups have smaller purchases with the price
increase, with the size of the reduction being smallest for those who would have increased
organic purchases without the price increase. As expected, the largest decrease came from the
group that responded most negatively to certification.
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Just under half (49.2%) of responses were correctly predicted by this model. Marginal
effects (table 6) in this model are much smaller than in the previous model, with the largest
effect coming in education. This result may be because the effect compares responses from
those with education level 1 (grade school only) to those with education level 6 (Master's or
PhD). The size of the marginal effects suggests that all groups are equally responsive to a price
increase for certification.
(Insert Table 6 Here)
Conclusions

Information asymmetry exists and may cause problems in the organic produce market
because of the difficulty consumers face in determining whether a product is truly organic. It
may be eliminated through the use of signals, reputation, and certification or licensing. Signals
based on appearance of organic versus conventional produce may not be effective, as there is
some evidence that organic produce may appear quite similar to conventionally grown produce.
Reputation is difficult to apply in this case because the consumer often does not know whether
the produce was indeed organically grown, or which farmer raised it. The usefulness of
certification depends in large part upon the credibility it has with consumers. If consumers do
not believe certification claims, information asymmetry problems remain.
The results of a survey of Utah consumers suggest that consumers do perceive a
difference in certification methods. Self-certification does not seem as effective as independent
certification (i.e., third party or government). However, it does not appear that there are large
differences between the independent certification methods. The respondents were sensitive to
increases in price and the response was similar for all certification methods. Response to
certification without a price increase was significant in explaining a response to certification
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with a price increase. People who indicated certification would increase their organic produce
purchases showed the least sensitivity to price. It may be that certification generates benefits not
significantly greater than and perhaps less than it would cost. However, given that organic
produce is a small portion of the produce market, a response large enough to have a significant
effect on the organic market may exist, even as most people continue to consume conventional
produce.
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\

Demographic
questions
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= 933)

Figure 1: Diagram of survey including order of questions.

= 624)
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Table 1: Variable names, descriptions, and summary statistics.
Variable
Purchasejj
Purchase2 jj
Buy Organicj (n=933)

Agej (n=933)

Genderj Cn=933)
EducatioDj (n=933)

Household Sizej Cn=933)
Household Incomej
(n=933)

Farm Certification
Store Certification
Independent Cert.
Utah Gov. Cert.
Federal Certification
Greatly Inc. Org. Pur.ij
Increase Org. Purchaseij
No Change Org. Pur.ij
Decrease Org. Pur.ij
Grtly. Decrease Org.
Pur.ij

Description
Frequency
Mean* Std. Dev.*
Organic produce purchase response to certification, without price increase.
5=Greatly incr, 4=Increase, 3=No change, 2=Decrease, 1=Greatly Decr.
Same as Purchase but a price increase of 10 percent is included.
Does the respondent currently
1.687
.915
purchase organic produce?
1 = No
= 62.38%
2 = Don't know
= 6.54%
3 = Yes
= 31.08%
Age of the respondent.
3.360
1.745
1 = 18-25 years
= 18.22%
2 = 26 - 35
= 19.51%
3 = 36 - 45
= 16.51%
= 16.18%
4 = 46 - 55
5 = 56 - 65
=10.40%
6 = > 65 years of age
= 18.22%
no answer
=.97%
Male = 1, Female = 2
1.692
.462
Highest level of education obtained.
4.077
1.021
1 = grade school
= 1.61%
2 = Some high school
=2.04%
3 = high school
= 24.87%
4 = Some college
= 37.94%
=25.62%
5 = Bachelor's
6 = Master's or PhD.
= 7.93%
Number living in household.
3.109
1.866
Household income level.
3.210
1.420
1 = < $15,000
=9.00%
2=$15-30K
= 15.86%
3 = $30 - 50 K
= 23.04%
4 = $50 - 75K
= 17.58%
5= $75-100 K
= 7.61%
6 = $100 - 150 K
= 3.43%
7=$150-250K
= 1.39%
= .32%
8 = > $250,000
no answer
= 21.76%
Dummy variable for farm level certification programs.
Dummy variable for a store certification program.
Dummy variable for an independent third party certifying agency.
Dummy variable for Utah state government certification.
Dummy variable for federal government certification.
Certification greatly increases organic produce purchase. CPurchaseij =5)
Certification would increase organic purchases. CPurchaseij = 4)
Certification would not change organic produce purchases. CPurchaseij = 3)
Certification would decrease organic produce purchases. CPurchaseij = 2)
Certification greatly decreases organic produce purchases. (Purchasejj = 1)

19

Table 2: Change in organic produce consumption with different types of certification,
appearance, and records of growth care and shipping.
No Price Increase
% ResEondents
Greatly
No
Increase
Increase
Change
Decrease
Certification T~e
(52
(42
(22
(32
Farm
8.0
29.8
53.1
8.4
34.9
50.0
8.0
Retailer
5.8
14.0
46.4
36.0
2.9
Indpdt. third party
Utah State Gov.
12.9
49.8
32.2
4.7
Federal Government
16.4
43.1
33.3
5.6
With a 10% Price Increase
% ResEondents
Farm
4.8
15.5
53.4
23.4
Retailer
3.8
54.6
24.4
13.9
25.8
49.4
Indpdt. third party
5.1
18.1
Utah State Gov.
28.2
44.7
18.1
6.3
26.0
44.9
18.1
Federal Government
7.5
* The mean is based on the numbers in parentheses in each column.

Greatly
Decrease
(12
0.7
1.3
0.7
0.4
1.6

Mean*
3.36
3.36
3.70
3.7
3.673

Standard
Deviation
0.775
0.766
0.767
0.768
0.869

2.9
3.2
1.6
2.7
3.5

2.96
2.91
3.147
3.171
3.159

0.835
0.811
0.829
0.891
0.927
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Table 3. Ordered Probit: Dependent Variable = change in purchase of certified organic
produce, no price increase (n=450).
Variable

Coefficient

Constant 1
1.402***
Constant2
2.792***
4.237***
Constant3
Constant4
5.098***
0.039
Buy Organic
Age
0.102
-0.027
Age2
Gender
0.118
-1.22***
Education
0.139***
Education2
-0.04*
Household Size
Income
-0.054**
-0.406***
Farm Certification
-0.461 ***
Store Certification
Independent Certification
0.053
0.002
Utah State Gov. Cert.
Log Likelihood (constant only)
Log Likelihood (constant + regressors)
Correctly Predicted
50.5%

*** significant at 1%

Std Error

P Value

0.432
0.439
0.451
0.458
0.042
0.124
0.018
0.083
0.211
0.025
0.023
0.029
0.085
0.077
0.072
0.043
-2677.5525
-2009.0219
Predicted
Within 1
Level

0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.341
0.409
0.134
0.155
0.000
0.000
0.084
0.059
0.000
0.000
0.463
0.961

94.4%

** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
1,765 observations used (353 households), due to non-responses to income question.
Dependent Variable: 1=greatly decrease purchases to 5=greatly increase purchases. Coefficients give change in
probability that dependent variable has higher value.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit, Effect of a Change from Lowest to Highest Category, Significant
Regressors Only. Dependent Variable = change in purchase of certified organic produce,
no price increase.

Decrease

Greatly
Decrease

.0937

.0443

.0117

-.3769

-.0597

-.0013

-5.9E-5

-.0031

-.0134

-.0010

.0148

.0027

Farm Cert

-.0125

-.0199

.0211

.009

.0022

Store Cert

-.0143

-.0225

.0241

.0127

0

Greatly
Increase

No Change
Increase

Income

-.0551

-.0946

Education*

.438

Household Size

*This number represents total effect of education (accounting for both the linear and quadratic terms)
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Table 5. Ordered Probit: Dependent variable = change in purchase of certified organic
produce with price increase (n=624).
Variable
Coefficient
Constant 1
0.889
Constant2
2.072***
Constant3
3.409***
Constant4
4.732***
Buy Organic
0.028
Age
0.132
Age2
-0.021
Gender
-0.184*
Education
-0.621 **
Education2
0.068*
Household Size
-0.056*
Income
0.029
Farm Certification
-0.111 *
-0.18***
Store Certification
Indep Certification
-0.038
Utah State Gov. Cert.
0.009
Increase Org. Purchase
-0.889***
No Change Org. Pur.
-1.399***
Decrease Org. Pur.
-2.171 ***
-3.561 ***
Greatly Deer. Org. Pur.
Log Likelihood (constant only)
Lo g Likelihood (constant + regressors)
Correctly Predicted
49.2%

*** significant at 1%

Std Error
0.607
0.614
0.631
0.68
0.053
0.143
0.02
0.099
0.315
0.037
0.032
0.039
0.061
0.058
0.049
0.033
0.177
0.187
0.2375
0.43
-3000.4059
-2089.7296
Predicted
within 1 level

P Value
0.1432
0.0007
0.0000
0.0000
0.6013
0.3568
0.3018
0.063
0.0485
0.0671
0.0757
0.4536
0.0677
0.0017
0.4471
0.7956
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

94.3%

** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
1,765 observations used (353 households), due to non-responses to income and certification without a price increase
questions.
Dependent Variable: 1=greatly decrease purchases to 5=greatly increase purchases. Coefficients give change in
probability that dependent variable has higher value.
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Table 6: Ordered Probit, Effect of a Change from Lowest to Highest Category, Significant
Regressors Only. Dependent variable = change in purchase of certified organic produce
with price increase.

Greatly
Increase

Increase

No Change

Decrease

Greatly
Decrease

Gender

1.92E-14

-7.76E-14

-5.09E-10

-6.96E-7

6.96E-7

Education*

1

-5.46E-6

-.0011

-.04

-.959

Household
Size

0

-1.66E-15

-1.884E-11

-3.454E-8

3.456E-8

Farm Cert

0

-5.44E-15

-5.01E-11

-7.22E-8

7.23E-8

Store Cert

0

-9.44E-15

-8.54E-11

-1.22E-7

1.22E-7

Increase
Org. Purch

-3E-15

-1.78E-11

-6.26E-8

-3.64E-5

3.65E-5

No Change
Org. Purch

-1.51E-13

-4.96E-10

-9.03E-7

-2.77E-4

2.78E-4

Decrease
Org. Purch

-3.44E-11

-4.65E-8

-3 .12E-5

-3.64E-3

3.67E-3

GrtlyDecr
Org. Purch

-1.43E-7

-3.90E-5

-.0045

-.0941

.0986

*This number represents total effect of education (accounting for both the linear and quadratic tenns)

